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ABSTRACT It is common to suggest that alternative exchange-rate regimes are not
related to different theoretical views about the workings of the economic system or
to different schools of economic thought. This paper, however, emphasizes the re-
lationship between alternative exchange-rate regimes and the different conceptions
of money and of the role of the market as an economic regulator. When an ex-
change-rate regime is selected decision makers expect to achieve macroeconomic
goals such as stimulating real economic growth and attaining long-run price stabil-
ity. But these results stem from divergent theoretical understandings of money and
its effects on the real economy — the neutrality or non-neutrality of money — and
from the acceptance or rejection of the classical ergodic axiom of efficient market
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theory. Hence, we support the argument that underlying the choice of an ex-
change-rate regime there are different theoretical views. The aim of this paper,
therefore, is to examine the main disagreements between the different prescrip-
tions about exchange-rate regimes using as background the articulations between
exchange-rate prescriptions and the monetary conceptions of different theorists.
Exchange-rate regimes come in three varieties: pegged (fixed, but adjustable),
floating, and fixed.
Key words: money, exchange-rate regimes, monetary theories
MOEDA E REGIMES CAMBIAIS: CONTROVÉRSIAS TEÓRICAS
RESUMO Em geral se afirma que os regimes de câmbio alternativos não têm rela-
ção com as diferentes correntes teóricas do pensamento econômico. Este trabalho
chama atenção, porém, para o fato de que a defesa de um determinado regime de
câmbio não é independente das diferentes concepções de moeda, nem das diversas
opiniões sobre o papel do mercado como regulador econômico. Quando um regi-
me de câmbio é escolhido, espera-se dele alguns resultados macroeconômicos,
como, por exemplo, crescimento garantido, ou estabilidade de preços. Estes resul-
tados dependem de pressupostos sobre a neutralidade ou não neutralidade da mo-
eda, e sobre a eficiência ou não do mercado como regulador econômico. O artigo
examina então os desacordos entre os defensores das diferentes prescrições cam-
biais, articulando tais desacordos com as argumentações relativas aos efeitos da
moeda sobre a economia. São analisados três tipos de câmbio: o fixo, o flutuante e
o administrado.
Palavras-chave: moeda, regimes de câmbio, teorias monetárias
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the recent period there has been an increasing interest in under-
standing the relationship between exchange-rate regimes and countries’
macroeconomic performance. It is commonly suggested that alternative ex-
change-rate regimes are neither related to different theoretical views about
the workings of the economic system nor to different schools of economic
thought. This paper, however, emphasizes the relationship between alterna-
tive exchange-rate regimes and the different conceptions of money and of
the market’s role as an economic regulator. When an exchange-rate regime
is selected decision makers expect to achieve macroeconomic goals such as
stimulating real economic growth and attaining long-run price stability, for
instance. But these results, as we will argue along the paper, stem from di-
vergent theoretical understandings of money and its effects on the real
economy — the neutrality or non-neutrality of money — and from the ac-
ceptance or rejection of the classical ergodic axiom of efficient market
theory. Hence, we support the argument that underlying the choice of an
exchange-rate regime there are different theoretical views.
The aim of this paper, therefore, is not to analyse exchange-rate
behaviour,1 but to examine the main disagreements between the different
prescriptions about exchange-rate regimes using as a background the ar-
ticulations between exchange-rate prescriptions and the monetary con-
ceptions of different theorists.2  Exchange-rate regimes come in three vari-
eties: pegged (fixed, but adjustable), floating, and fixed.
In order to conduct our study, we first undertake a bibliographic review
centred on the theoretical arguments presented by the advocates and critics
of each type of regime, and once their differences are understood, we at-
tempt an explanation of where we stand (and for what reasons) as far as the
debate is concerned.
Since exchange-rate prescriptions are largely implied by the wider theo-
retical views of authors, we shall set out the main features of the monetary
conceptions that support the arguments of each group. The contrast be-
tween those offering exchange-rate prescriptions and those offering mon-
etary control remedies allows us to classify the different authors in a mean-
ingful way. The taxonomy to be adopted while conducting the analysis has a
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didactic purpose as well: to highlight the main principles underlying econo-
mists’ disagreements in exchange-rate matters.
The paper is structured as follows: in section 1 we introduce our topic; in
section 2 we compare the views on exchange-rate issues of those we classify
as short-run neutral, long-run neutral, and as non-neutral. Then, also in
section 2, subsection 2.4, we discuss one of the most popular types of ex-
change-rate arrangements among emerging economies in the recent period,
namely the fixing of target zones or bands. Finally, in section 3, our general
conclusions are presented.
2. A COMPARISON OF SHORT-RUN NEUTRAL, LONG-RUN NEUTRAL,
AND NON-NEUTRAL VIEWS CONCERNING EXCHANGE-RATE ISSUES
Theories of money in economics are very different. This is particularly so
when they deal with the ways economists perceive the effects of money on
the real economy. First we distinguish theorists who see money as neutral in
both the short run and the long run. These people support the idea that
money has no permanent effects upon real economic variables and that the
natural outcome of a monetary expansion is a rise in the price level. This
argument underlies the traditional Quantity Theory of Money (MV = Py) in
its strongest version. We call this approach the “short-run neutral view”.
Secondly, the “long-run neutral view” will be associated with analysts who
adopt an intermediate position — its advocates recognise the effects of
money on the real economy, but only in the short run, and attribute these
temporary impacts to market failures, imperfect information, and price ri-
gidities. These effects are, however, reversed in the long run and do not per-
sist. Therefore, in the long run, these theorists also accept the QTM, and the
analytical framework of long-run money neutrality. Finally, we identify as
“non-neutral” those theorists to whom money has lasting real effects upon
economies, hence money is never neutral, either in the long run or in the
short run. These theorists reject the QTM under the perception that expan-
sions of the money stock may permanently affect real production without
necessarily causing increases in the price level.
To the different conclusions about money neutrality correspond differ-
ences in the three positions regarding their attitudes towards beliefs on the
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self-regulating capacities of private markets. As is well known, this question
is placed under discussion by “Say’s Law of Markets”, the principle accepted
by those who see money as neutral and markets as self-regulating, but ne-
glected by others. The view on whether markets know better than govern-
ments is related to the conception of money being adopted, and is also em-
bodied in the arguments behind different proposals for exchange-rate
arrangements.3
Theorists who see money as neutral in the short run argue that equilib-
rium economic conditions are determined by real factors (factor availabil-
ity, technology, preferences, etc.) no matter what the supply of money
might be since monetary variables only affect prices. These theorists believe
that the money supply can be and is controlled by monetary authorities.
Therefore, monetary authorities are considered responsible for inflation for
allowing a quantity of money inconsistent with price stability. Thus, the
“short-run neutral view” attaches priority to price stability because money
is considered neutral, and prescribes fixed monetary rules to avoid any dis-
cretionary action by monetary authorities. This view is consistent with a
fixed exchange-rate prescription which implies that the supply of money is
independent from monetary authorities, who are considered responsible
for inflation.
As a representative of those who take this line, the main emphasis in our
discussion will be placed on McKinnon’s (1988) thesis of fixed-exchange-
rate arrangements. We shall also examine the New Classical approach to ex-
change-rate questions. Although in the past this approach has tended to
adopt a variety of views, its more recent advocates have given support to
McKinnon’s arguments on using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor
and on his views on the rules vs. discretion debate.
Theorists classified as supporters of the “long-run neutral view”
(Dornbush, 1976; Krugman, 1990, 1991, 1992, and Williamson, 1988,
1992-1993) believe that monetary impulses affect the real economy in the
short run, by changing relative prices and temporarily hindering the work
of market adjustment. These economists recognise the rigidity of some
prices and are also aware that the use of information may not be perfect and
may lead to market failures in the short run. Therefore, some discretionary
action by the state is admitted, in the short run, while these difficulties per-
10  R. Econ. contemp., Rio de Janeiro, 5(1): 5-47, jan./jun. 2001
sist. However, they do not doubt that the price mechanism is the most effi-
cient means of resource allocation. It is the belief in the ultimately benign
nature of the price mechanism, regardless of temporary imperfections and
rigidities, that induce the “long-run neutral view” proponents to prescribe
floating exchange rates. The reason, as will be seen later on, lies in the belief
that movements in the exchange rate compensate for rigidities that charac-
terise other markets.
Finally, to the adherents of the non-neutral approach (Aglietta, 1986 a,
b, c, and 1987; Davidson, 1992-1993; Cartapanis, 1984; De Bernis and Byé,
1987; Guttmann, 1994; Kuttner, 1991) money is never neutral, either in the
short run or the long run; expectations are formed under uncertainty; and
time should be understood as historical rather than logical. It is the accep-
tance of the principle of non-neutral money that permits these theorists to
abandon “Say’s Law of Markets” (which embraces the notion that since in-
jections into and leakages from the circular flow of income are always equal
there is no need for permanent governmental intervention in the function-
ing of the macroeconomy). In rejecting Say’s Law, theorists are suggesting
that exchange rates are not brought about by equilibrium-determined fac-
tors and therefore they advocate a measure of government activism in ex-
change-rate matters. The chief prescription offered is of pegged (fixed but
adjustable) exchange rates to be used as a discretionary policy tool. The
main economic policy goal, to these theorists, is sustainable growth and
maximum employment. In the short run, the economy should be adjusted
with “fine-tuning” policy decisions in order to smooth economic fluctua-
tions, to achieve full employment and/or to reduce the social costs of these
fluctuations. Above all, for this group of theorists, it is palpably clear that
“unemployment beyond what can be explained by friction or search exists
and may persist for long periods of time” (Chick, 1995, p. 24). In other
words, the non-neutral view denies that a completely unregulated free mar-
ket performs in a non-problematic way. In the face of this, the non-neutral
view advocates discretionary economic policy in general, and discretionary
monetary and exchange-rate policy in particular. The foundational intu-
ition behind this recommendation is the idea that the economic system is
engaged in a process through actual, irreversible, historical time, and that
theory and policy prescriptions should capture this fact. Consequently,
11M. L. R. Mollo, M. L. F. Silva e T. S. Torrance – Money and exchange-rate regimes...
discretion is welcome due to the fact that the future is unknown and cannot
be trusted to “blind” market mechanisms. In these circumstances, govern-
ment interventions diminish the uncertainty related to decentralised deci-
sions, lessen the effects of uncertainty upon private investment decisions,
and reduce the social costs provoked by economic instability. It is also held,
of course, that “nominal” causes can and do have permanent “real” effects
on the performance of economies. Therefore, the main government priority
— economic growth — should be pursued by using (amongst other things)
discretionary monetary and exchange-rate policies.
Consistent with the main ideas outlined above, the adherents of non-
neutrality attach different priorities to the operation of monetary systems.
These priorities are reflected in a distinctive prescription for exchange-rate
arrangements. Those who consider money to be largely neutral attach a
high priority to the efficiency of market allocation and to controlling the
price level.4  In sharp contrast, the non-neutral approach focuses on the
goal of economic growth and on ways to remove obstacles (such as macro-
economic instability) that stand in the path of its achievement. The latter
theorists strongly disagree with the adage that “markets always know best”
and support discretion in government policy-making behaviour.
It is interesting to notice that various technical devices have been em-
ployed to introduce long-run real effects of monetary shocks into contem-
porary mainstream models (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). These analyses,
however, come from a different conceptual framework that recognises risk
instead of uncertainty and in which the market is considered to be a better
regulatory device than government. This explains why they prescribe rules
instead of discretion, despite the alleged non-neutrality of money in the
long run (Neumeyer, 1998).5
2.1 The “short-run neutral view” and
the fixed-exchange-rate prescription: a contradiction?
Theoretical arguments
Theorists who see money as neutral in the short run argue that equilibrium
conditions are determined by real factors and money only affects prices.
Furthermore, since markets always know better than governments, market-
12  R. Econ. contemp., Rio de Janeiro, 5(1): 5-47, jan./jun. 2001
determined exchange-rates (floating exchange rates) should be the natural
way to avoid misalignments. This was the dominant view among main-
stream economists in the 1970’s, persuaded as they were, according to
Frankel (1996, p. 153), by Milton Friedman’s (1953) earlier defence of the
benefits of floating exchange rates. In his famous article, Friedman (1953) in
his advocacy of floating exchange rates placed emphasis on the argument of
greater stability; he argued that way inasmuch as “speculators would be sta-
bilizing rather than destabilizing, because any who increased the magnitude
of exchange-rate fluctuations could only do so by buying high and selling
low, which is a recipe for going out of business” (Frankel, 1996, p. 153).
However, economists such as McKinnon, who is an adherent of the
group we classify as “short-run neutrals”, represent an interesting exception
to the rule. McKinnon’s (1988, p. 95) advocacy that exchange rates should
be fixed has led to a stimulating debate. He believes that exchange-rate de-
valuation can improve a country’s net trade balance only temporarily. Ac-
cording to his perception, an exchange-rate devaluation, while leading to a
balance of payments (BP) surplus, increases the money supply, which raises
aggregate demand and prices, thereby undoing the initial competitive gains
experienced by domestically produced goods.
This is, therefore, a view of short-run neutrality of money,6  since the
above argument suggests that it is fast price increases that quickly undo the
gains of competitiveness obtained with an exchange-rate devaluation when
we have a floating system. Consequently, authors such as McKinnon reveal
a stance which is contrary to the idea that the exchange rate can be used as
an economic tool to improve competitiveness.
The idea of fast adjustment and easy fulfilment of equilibrium positions
with a fixed exchange-rate system is reinforced when McKinnon argues that
“with confidence in official parities, very small changes in interest rates
would attract (or repel) sufficient capital to equilibrate foreign exchanges”
(McKinnon, 1988, p. 93), or when he says that “very little monetary adjust-
ment on a daily or even weekly basis would be necessary as long as every one
knew that decisive official action would be forthcoming if the need arose”
(McKinnon, 1988, p. 93).
The assumption underlying that sort of prescription is that trade and
capital flows tend to prevail against each other, balancing international
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transactions without need of a change in international relative prices. Thus,
the nominal exchange rate, established at the purchasing power parity (PPP)
level, need not be altered. From this derives the idea of fast adjustment and
of short-run money neutrality. As McKinnon (1988, p. 95) argues: “pur-
chasing power parity can be an unambiguous theoretical guide for central
banks and one with which the private financial markets can also feel com-
fortable”. This sort of adjustment requires perfect price flexibility. There-
fore, not only nominal exchange-rate movements are transmitted instanta-
neously to prices, maintaining the real exchange rate fixed, but relative
prices between tradable and non-tradable goods adjust immediately. This
behaviour provides that surplus (deficits) in current accounts are instanta-
neously compensated by deficit (surplus) in capital accounts thus eliminat-
ing the need for exchange-rate variations.
When accepting PPP, according to which nominal exchange rates should
be calculated so that the national price level of internationally tradable
goods would be aligned as approximately measured by their respective pro-
ducer or wholesale prices indices, McKinnon (1988, p. 93) is led to propose,
in addition, a nominal anchor for the system as a whole, through a common
(wholesale) price level, which would guarantee the equalisation of inflation
rates among the countries that agree to avoid exchange-rate fluctuations
between their currencies. Viewed from the preoccupation with monetary
control seen as a mechanism to assure price stability, it is evident that this
result is the main economic goal to be pursued according to this group of
theorists.
In fact, since short-run money neutrality is a principle accepted by this
group, the real exchange rate (which is a relative price) does not matter be-
cause it is not affected by nominal variables. Supposing PPP in the short
run, or “under continuous PPP, the domestic price level would be deter-
mined by the exchange rate, and inflation stabilization thus required slow-
ing the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate” (Agénor & Montiel, 1996,
p. 275). This line of reasoning is in full accord with our interpretation of the
recommendation of fixed exchange rates, PPP in the short run, and the pri-
ority attached to price stability as the main policy goal to be achieved. In
other words, if E is the price of the foreign currency in terms of the domestic
currency (the nominal exchange rate), P is the domestic price level and P *
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the level of the foreign prices, it follows that: E = P – P *, where a hat above
the variables denotes a percentage change.
So, the price levels among countries should, at least if not converge,
change in the same proportion to guarantee the maintenance of the fixed
nominal exchange rate. Therefore, it could be argued that from this point of
view, the best way to avoid different inflation rates among countries is the
adoption of a fixed exchange-rate system. McKinnon’s argument for fixed
rates was built within his contribution to the optimum currency area
theory. In an optimum currency area you should have a single currency re-
gime, or, which is almost the same thing, a fixed exchange-rate system with
guaranteed convertibility of currencies. Therefore, it is the priority attached
to price stability that underlies McKinnon’s preoccupation with monetary
aggregate control.
Regarding the role of government, these authors, while fixing the ex-
change rate upon some technical relation such as PPP, in order to guarantee
price stability through the QTM, resemble the advocates of the gold stan-
dard who accept a fixed rule for money issue despite defending market free-
dom, provided that the rule is not left at the mercy of the government.7  The
proposal of a fixed exchange rate is similar to, although it is even more lim-
iting than the gold standard, for it is immune to the fluctuations due to
changes in money supply such as noted by McKinnon:
To defend its national gold parity, each nation came to regulate domestic
money issue according to its balance on international payments. Surplus
countries automatically expanded their money supplies while those in defi-
cit contracted. Almost by accident, this resulted in generally fixed nominal
exchange rates within narrow bands called the gold points for each pair of
national currencies, in purchasing power parity, and in similar rates of do-
mestic price inflation in each country. (McKinnon, 1988, p. 101)
It should be noted that the fixed nominal rate recommended by
McKinnon (1988) is different from what is suggested by “non-neutral” au-
thors because, as we shall see, the latter accept that the rate can be modified
when it is intended to be used as a tool of economic policy, whereas to the
former the rate is a fixed rule, independent of economic policy and histori-
cal time, though established initially to approximate purchasing power
parities. McKinnon argues that the fixed exchange-rate system, by way of a
ˆ ˆˆ
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common monetary standard, would tend to be more efficient not only be-
cause it would remove the harmful volatility of floating rates but also be-
cause the interventions necessary to keep trade balanced would not need to
be great. This is so since, as we have discussed before, small variations in the
interest rate (through open market or rediscount operations) are all that is
required to provide credibility to fixed parities, and would suffice either to
attract or discourage foreign capital according to the circumstances. On his
view, “only as a last resort, or because of unusual turbulence, would sub-
stantial direct intervention in the foreign exchanges be necessary” (op. cit.,
p. 93). He advocates that nations should collaborate over the adjustment
process. Moreover, his understanding is that arbitrageurs would end up
stabilising the exchange rate through portfolio flows, for they gather unam-
biguous information about the foreign-exchange market and about the
central banks’ intentions. It suffices that countries respect the common in-
flation rate and the agreed level of money stocks for nominal parity to be
maintained. Therefore, according to McKinnon (1988), besides the fixed
rates, such as in Bretton Woods,8 what is needed is a restrictive money sup-
ply to assure stable price levels in different countries, thus limiting the
choice between different rates of inflation and unemployment. At the time
of Keynes, he argues, trade was limited and capital flows were restricted,
and it was this that ensured there were no great variations in reserves.
Nonetheless, he argues, the greater interaction of capital markets nowadays
requires a nominal anchor closer to the gold standard than to Bretton
Woods.
Belief in the short-run neutrality of money does not lead directly to the
prescription of fixed exchange rates. This can be concluded by examining
the arguments of monetarists and some of the new classical theorists in
favour of floating exchange-rate regimes. Nevertheless, the new classical
analysts are certainly advocates of the principle of money neutrality in the
short run. This becomes evident in their critique of exchange-rate bands,
which are an intermediate option between fixed and floating exchange-rate
arrangements. We will come back to this topic later. According to Frenkel
and Goldstein (1986), the New Classical School assumes that the announce-
ment of monetary policies to be adopted by the government is preferable to
the announcement of bands of fluctuation acting as anchors. They distrust
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government knowledge about the “correct” economic model to be able to
accurately fix the band’s limits.
It is interesting to notice that in this kind of debate the New Classical
theorists present themselves as floaters. However, when dealing with the
credibility issue, a controversy that runs parallel to the choice of exchange-
rate regimes, they come close to McKinnon’s prescription and suggest the
adoption of fixed exchange rates as anchors in the stabilisation programmes
of several countries (e.g. in Latin America). It is well known that the propo-
sition of gaining credibility by tying the hands of the national monetary au-
thority has become fashionable as a solution to the so-called “time-incon-
sistency problem”.9 The proposal comes in the form of what is understood
as a more credible commitment to a fixed exchange rate, such as is offered
by a modern version of the old ‘currency-board’ arrangements. Therefore,
the notion of short-run neutrality of money ends up allowing the classifica-
tion of the New Classical School, as well as McKinnon, as supporters of
fixed exchange rates as the monetary rule.
The critique
The critics of this sort of system support their arguments by taking into ac-
count various empirical and theoretical considerations.
On empirical grounds, the evidence strongly rejects PPP in the short run.
If output prices were flexible, as the market-clearing models assume, a
change in the exchange-rate regime would not have any effect on the statis-
tical distribution of the real exchange rate. The data, however, does not sus-
tain this prediction. According to Mussa (1986), the variance of real ex-
change rates for industrial countries that moved from fixed to floating
exchange rate regimes increased dramatically.10
On theoretical grounds the arguments are summarised as follows: the
PPP view, while assuming the idea of only one price, involves a conception
of homogeneous goods in international trade, ignoring existing differences
between countries regarding their production and trade structures. It does
not take into consideration the differentiated effects of foreign shocks, or
the differences concerning, for instance, efficiency gains, new consumption
standards, and income effects. Furthermore, it does not account for the
problems of price stickiness and the interventions of central banks, assum-
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ing that the real exchange rate tends to a stable level that could be regarded
as the equilibrium level of the exchange rate. The PPP theory also does not
take into consideration differences between tradable and non-tradable
goods which hinder the emergence of a single price. This is, indeed, a way of
seeing the world as a homogeneous trade space, a position which, according
to the critics of the “non-neutral view”, is highly questionable.
There are other theoretical limitations on the use of PPP and the concep-
tion of economy implied therein. These limitations are appreciated equally
by the theorists of the “long-run neutral view” and by the “non-neutral
view”. The views of these groups will be examined in Subsections 2.2 & 2.3,
where their ideas on the appropriate exchange rate regime will also be ap-
praised.
Regarding the actual problems encountered by the prescription of a
fixed exchange-rate regime, the advocates of floating exchange rates argue
that speculative flows ended the Bretton Woods system. In accordance with
critics of this regime, the need to maintain a high level of reserves is itself a
problem of the fixed exchange-rate arrangements, and the perception by
economic agents that a situation concerning reserves is precarious can lead
to speculative attacks against the local currency that end up forcing a change
in the rate, thus accelerating and broadening the depreciation of the cur-
rency in question.
The possibility of currency crises due to speculative attacks has been for-
mulated by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984). Their models
are referred to by the literature as first-generation crisis models or ‘canoni-
cal’ crisis models and can be considered as a starting point for a vast and
stimulating literature about the topic. These studies point to monetary
policy limits for the sustainability of fixed exchange-rate regimes. To the
question of the feasibility of fixed exchange rates has now been added the
problem of credibility.
Since the exchange rate is an easy tool to manipulate and can adjust an
economy without great cost, governments are tempted to use it. The higher
the likelihood of government action, the higher is the vulnerability to
speculative attacks because the lower is the credibility (De Grauwe, 1992).11
This problem of relinquishing the exchange-rate instrument is explored
by De Grauwe (1992), when he approaches the question of liquidity in in-
complete monetary unions, that is, those unions where national currencies
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survive but the exchange rate between them is kept fixed. In the case of a
system of n countries, there are only n-1 exchange rates. “Therefore, n-1
monetary authorities will be forced to adjust their monetary policy instru-
ment so as to maintain a fixed exchange rate” (ibid., p. 11). In other words,
only one central bank will be able freely to set its monetary policy, because
the others will be forced to adjust their tools of monetary policy to hold the
agreed parities. The system is reduced to one degree of freedom, which
makes us wonder who will use this degree of freedom: which central bank
will independently establish its monetary policy? Two ways have been pro-
posed in his work. One alternative is the co-operative solution, whereby the
countries subjected to a fixed exchange rate agree in choosing the level of li-
quidity and interest rate that best suit each of them. The other alternative is
the asymmetric solution, whereby a leading country establishes its money
stock independently and determines the interest rate that will be common
to all those other countries. Given the money demand of those other coun-
tries, its money stocks will accommodate in such a way that the common
interest rate prevails. Therefore, those countries will lose control over im-
portant domestic variables.
Another problem concerning the adoption of fixed exchange rates is the
loss of monetary policy as a tool of economic policy. Monetary policy is in-
effective with any degree of capital mobility, because the domestic money
supply is left at the mercy of the flow of reserves necessary to maintain the
fixed exchange-rate parity. In other words, the quantity of money becomes
endogenous and monetary policy passive.
To those who advocate freely floating exchange rates, as will be discussed
below, money is neutral and monetary policy is ineffective only in the long
run. Since in the short run these theorists accept that money affects real
variables, some role is attributed to monetary policy regardless of its transi-
tory nature. Interventions are accepted if the market logic is respected. That
explains why they condemn the adoption of fixed exchange rates when the
scenario is one of highly mobile capitals, since any kind of monetary policy
is ruled out even in the short run.
The adherents of the non-neutrality of money are much more critical
about the abdication of pursuing monetary policy since they believe that it
can always be used, particularly to stimulate growth.
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2.2 The “long-run neutral view” and floating exchange rates
Theoretical arguments
We have classified theorists as advocates of the “long-run neutral view”
when they believe that monetary impulses are capable of affecting the real
economy in the short run, due to price viscosity and lags of the market price
mechanism. Adjustment is not instantaneous. These theorists seem to agree
with the Post-Keynesian principle that “time is a device that prevents every-
thing from happening at once” (Davidson, 1996, p. 480). However, there is
no substantive agreement as we will explain in subsection 2.3.
PPP assumes no change in relative prices among countries.12  This view is
also the assumption for the long run of the “long-run neutral” theory of
money. However, this group does appreciate that monetary impulses can
impact on relative prices in the short run (when money is considered not
neutral). This is the reason why Dornbusch (1976) adds the idea of a per-
manent real exchange rate that reflects the PPP rate, and is concerned to
describe the exact path of the nominal exchange rate toward its long-run
equilibrium level following the adjustment process. This path involves dif-
ferences in the adjustment speed of the various prices, with the exchange
rate being faster to adjust than almost all other prices.
Williamson (1992-1993) equally admits some effect of money upon the
real economy in the short run, when the governmental intervention postu-
lated by Keynesians could be justified. Nevertheless, in the long run, he de-
nies these real effects given the neutrality of money. As he puts it: “our pro-
posals were based on a reasonable eclectic view of macroeconomic theory
that combines short-run Keynesian truths with the long-run reality of the
neutrality of money” (Williamson, 1992-1993, p. 182).
According to advocates of the long-run neutral view, such as Dornbusch
(1988) and Krugman (1990, 1991, 1992), the fact that there is no perfect in-
tegration of markets or perfect substitutability among goods is what hinders
the regulating market from working perfectly. For instance, there are differ-
ent preferences between tradable and non-tradable goods among countries.
If there is a lender country with a BP surplus position and a borrower coun-
try with a BP deficit position, and even if both have imbalances of the same
absolute magnitude, it is very possible that the adjustment of the balance of
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payments will occur alongside changes in the exchange-rate. (This would be
denied by the “short-run neutral” theorists, who believe that all market ad-
justments are instantaneous, and in this situation there would never be any
change in relative prices.) The exchange rate change would occur if, for in-
stance, a change in the income of the exporters of the deficit country caused
a change in the level of demand for non-tradable goods greater than the
change in the level of demand for tradable goods: this situation would then
require a change in relative prices in order to accommodate the differential
increase in demand, and this relative price change would be reflected in an
exchange rate change. Hence, the authors quoted conclude that exchange
rates should float.13
This group believes that the government, in macroeconomic stabilisat-
ion, must stick to an active monetary policy but should support allocative
efficiency by leaving individual markets to their own devices. That is what
Krugman (1991) calls “activism on the macro side, but laissez-faire on the
micro side” (op. cit., p. 24).14
It is the belief in the long-run equilibrium, guaranteed by real conditions
(since in the long run they accept the neutrality of money principle), that
leads these economists to sanction a degree of government intervention,
though it should be as little as possible and meant only to compensate for
the rigidity of some prices. Any kind of intervention with a more permanent
nature tends to cause crises. An example of this sort of argument can be
found in Krugman (1979) when he relates balance-of-payments crises with
exchange-rate management by governments and speculative attacks. The
idea is that when reserves fall to some level considered critical, there would
be an abrupt speculative attack which would quickly exhaust foreign re-
serves, forcing the country to abandon the fixed or pegged exchange-rate
arrangement.
In fact, it is possible to note that, for these authors, it is just sticky prices
that hinder quick market adjustment. Nevertheless, they hold that the mar-
ket continues to be efficient and to signal the right direction towards full-
employment equilibrium. Thus, as they view it, monetary policy is the most
adequate interventionist tool, for it implies the least discretion. Floating ex-
change rates are also prescribed because the market would be in charge of
their determination.15 At the same time, they argue that the flexibility of the
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exchange-rate can compensate for the rigidities of the other markets, which
could lead to greater allocative efficiency in the economy as a whole.
Floating exchange rates, as we have said, were initially advocated by Mil-
ton Friedman (1953), who argued they would lead to greater stability, for
the movements of nominal rates would tend to approach their “normal”
values, keeping the balance of payments in equilibrium.16  Harry Johnson
(1969) considered them essential to the maintenance of national autonomy
and independence, as exchange-rate fluctuations would isolate domestic
changes in prices within different economies and would allow domestic
policies to be deployed consistently with the country’s internal equilibrium.
Williamson (1988) points out four social functions of market-deter-
mined exchange rates. A first function of floating exchange rates is that of
reconciling inflation rates among countries.17 A second one is that of facili-
tating payment adjustments in response, for instance, to permanent real
shocks, by changing the incentives to export/import. Williamson’s dis-
agreement with McKinnon “concerns his implicit theory of payments ad-
justment, which leads him to reject any role for exchange rate changes in
facilitating that process” (op. cit., p. 115). The third function associated with
a freely floating exchange-rate regime is that it allows each economy to keep
temporarily a differential between its domestic interest rate and the foreign
rate. Thus, the country would be free to conduct its own monetary policies.
Finally, he argues that exchange-rate flexibility allows the economy to ab-
sorb part of existing speculative pressures. “Instead of requiring that every
change in speculative sentiment lead to a change in international reserves
and/or interest rate, one can allow changes in the exchange rate to take
some of the strain” (op. cit., p. 116). However, as Davidson (1992-1993) has
argued, “Williamson fails to provide any empirical evidence to demonstrate
that these claimed advantages of flexible rates have been achieved in the real
world” (op. cit., p. 166).
The critique
The disadvantages attributed to floating exchange rates by the “non-neutral
view” supporters have to do with the fact that its critics do not agree with
the assumption, implicit in its prescription, that the “exchange-rate market
is fundamentally stable, in the sense that every disequilibrium is transmitted
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to the price and exchange-rate systems, which in turn react absorbing such
disequilibrium” (Cartapanis, 1984, p. 54-55). The point is, as noticed by
Cartapanis, “the belief in the ultimate efficiency of market mechanisms in
an international scale” and “the acceptance of the assumption of the float-
ing exchange-rate endogenous stability, conceiving, therefore, that instabil-
ity responds to exogenous causes” (ibid., p. 55).
Nonetheless, whatever the theoretical advantages and disadvantages al-
ready mentioned, the volatility of the exchange rates after 1973 contradicted
Friedman’s promise of stability. Furthermore, the difficulties faced by Eu-
ropean countries, whose reserves were not at the desired levels, have forced
governments to intervene and have ended up by restricting the possibilities
of national autonomy and independence preached by Johnson (1969).
Therefore, exchange-rate volatility itself has tended to render the pre-
scription of a floating exchange-rate system inapplicable.18
The discussion about exchange-rate volatility comprises two types of ar-
guments, namely, those regarding its diagnosis and those regarding the
conclusions about the most adequate exchange-rate regime.
Free-market adherents do not interpret exchange-rate volatility as a
negative phenomenon. In the first place, they raise doubts about the volatil-
ity itself, for the prices of goods and wages have been taken as references.
These are naturally more sticky, whereas exchange rates are auction prices
that carry future expectations and are more unstable than the others, by
definition (Krugman, 1991). Besides, they argue that even though exchange
rates may be more unstable they have a developed futures market, which
implies an ability to undertake greater foresight than in the goods and
labour markets. Thus, it is better that volatility occurs in the exchange-rate
market than in the goods and labour markets. This becomes a favourable
argument for floating exchange rates and for the fact that exchange-rate
markets are better arenas for adjustment. According to this argument, the
maintenance of the Bretton Woods system of fixed rates would have created
an even worse situation, for it would have transmitted inadequate signals
within an atmosphere full of disturbances and structural changes embodied
in the exchange-rate variations.
Finally, another type of argument is that the cost of exchange volatility is
lower than is often believed, due to the observed displacement between ex-
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change-rate movements and the real economy (Krugman, 1991). Such a
phenomenon is known as “hysteresis”.19
McKinnon’s (1988) position is once again peculiar when compared to
his partners: he does not agree with the assumption that futures markets ef-
fectively remove exchange-rate risk. According to him, exchange volatility
causes volatile preferences between assets due to the uncertainty regarding
the future purchasing power of the domestic currency. When exchange
rates are floating, portfolio preferences become extremely sensitive to
“news” (or gossip) regarding monetary and exchange-rate policies among
countries, and their effects on exchange rates are significant. He also argues
that monetary fluctuations enlarge real fluctuations in the case of exchange
rate flexibility, whereas fixed rates allow real effects to be gradually absorbed
without the instability of floating rates. Furthermore, commodities futures
markets are not complete and therefore they cannot protect investments in
the production of traded goods and services from exchange-rate risk. And
exchange fluctuations that amplify investment risk also inhibiting it.
Another interpretation of exchange-rate volatility is given by non-neu-
tral Post-Keynesian authors such as Aglietta (1987), to whom the excess of
international liquidity after 1971 is related to an “international-debt-
economy” framework that causes the creation of an international medium
of exchange independent from the U.S. current account, and has to do with
gold demonetisation.20  Those who have defended floating rates have be-
lieved that markets would adjust the system through financial arbitrage,
which replaces with advantage the earlier reliance on monetary rules. Ac-
cording to Aglietta (op. cit.), the “international-debt-economy” crisis does
not become explicit through a generalised liquidity preference for gold, as
in earlier times, but through an over-indebtedness process and recurrent
crises in exchange-rate relations. Thus, an increase in international liquidity
with an excess of credit, for example, has forced Germany to absorb dollars
in order to avoid an appreciation of the mark that could be harmful to its
domestic aims, and by doing so it has caused domestic inflation. Analysing
this kind of adjustment Aglietta (1987) has stated that “the monetary ad-
justments were subjected to credit expansion, and not to monetary rules
disciplining credit”, and has denied the efficiency of adjustments through
floating exchange rates. On the contrary, Aglietta (1986 a) interprets the
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floating exchange-rate regime with capital mobility as an “explosive mix-
ture”, for international monetary relations propagate shocks very quickly
and these shocks may be enlarged by expectations. According to his percep-
tion, great fluctuations come from liquidity preference in a floating-ex-
change-rate and capital-mobility framework. Confidence emphasises the
liquidity attribute of money, and this is a collective judgement made unani-
mously by the majority of economic agents. “Such as every judgement by
public opinion, trust in a particular kind of international liquidity is emi-
nently versatile if it is not anchored on commonly accepted rules and if it is
not guaranteed by a credible monetary authority” (op. cit., p. 21). Thus, “ex-
change-rate instability reflects the liquidity-preference instability due to the
lack of rules and warranties in the relations among international curren-
cies”. Moreover, “liquidity preference becomes unstable as regards the total
amount demanded and the kind of desired assets” (op. cit., p. 21).
Last but not least, one of the most important criticisms on floating ex-
change rates comes from within the long-run neutral group itself. The rec-
ognition that the movements of exchange rates are not correlated to the
movement of the fundamentals of the economy became a serious concern.
This was provoked, on the empirical ground, by the seminal work of Rogoff
(1980) that showed that a random walk model produced better predictions
than any other model. On the other hand, it came to be supported by a
growing literature on “bubbles” and “multiple equilibria”.21  Exchange-rate
movements came to reflect self-fulfilling expectations and had little to do
with “fundamentals”.
2.3 The “non-neutral view”: denying market automatism and the
conception of a homogeneous economic space
Theoretical arguments
The third group — the “non-neutral group” — comprises the critics of the
“short-run and long-run neutral” theorists since they disagree with their
basic model and/or the way money is viewed by them (Aglietta, 1986 a, b, c,
and 1987; Davidson, 1992-1993; Cartapanis, 1984; De Bernis and Byé, 1987;
Guttmann, 1994; Kuttner, 1991). For the former, as it is well known, money
is never neutral, either in the short or in the long run; expectations are
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formed under uncertainty; and time should be understood as historical
rather than logical. Under these circumstances, in a world in which the
axiom of money neutrality does not work and that is permeated by private
self-interest conflicts, the expected result is radical uncertainty and high so-
cial costs that the market cannot avoid. The operation of the government is
essential in this economic system to assure full “employment” effective de-
mand.22 Centralisation of decisions reduces the uncertainty that inhibits
private investment. Compensatory expenditures may be needed to lessen
the fluctuations of private investments, diminishing the social costs of eco-
nomic instability. It is the acceptance of the principle of non-neutrality of
money that permits this theorists to abandon the principle of Say’s Law and
the view of the market as an efficient regulating mechanism. When denying
this principle theorists are suggesting that exchange rates are not brought
about by equilibrium-determined factors and they advocate the need of
government activism in exchange-rate matters. Exchange-rate determina-
tion needs to rely on government discretionary policies. As said before, one
of the fundamental reasons for not accepting the view that the private
economy is inherently self-correcting, in the case of the non-neutral ap-
proach, is the principle underlying their analysis that understands the eco-
nomic system as engaged in a process through actual, irreversible, historical
time. Therefore, in each moment the present affects the future. “In a his-
torical process, the future is by nature unknown. Uncertainty is inescap-
able.” (Chick, 1995, p. 24). According to Chick, “to make historical time
manageable Keynes separated the short from the long period. These, how-
ever, differ radically from the classical conception: there is no presumption
that the long period is a centre of gravitation, nor that the short period is
merely a transitory state” (ibid., p. 27).
An implication of this principle is that they believe in the feasibility of
stabilising the economy through government policy design. Under these
circumstances, the expectational forecasts of decision-makers play an im-
portant role whenever the outcome of any choice of exchange rate occurs at
a later instant of time than the instant when the decision is made. Therefore,
it is no longer possible to determine a priori a long-run equilibrium condi-
tion. Furthermore, money, according to this view, gains an additional im-
portance: to co-ordinate indirectly the economic process by combining
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decentralised decisions and, to a certain extent, bringing the future into the
present in the form of monetary contracts.
To these theorists the idea of purchasing power parity is a wrong prin-
ciple. They deny the validity of axiomatic approaches. In this case, the axi-
omatic approach implies the equality of productive conditions and the ho-
mogeneity of economies and economic agents: without these factors the
system of prices and the “free” flow of goods and capital in the international
space would not take place smoothly, leading to an equalisation of domestic
and foreign prices of different goods. As we recall, it is this conception of
homogeneity that prompts the “short-run view and long-run neutral view”
supporters to ignore the change in relative prices that occurs in the short or
in the long run. It is only because these theorists see economic spaces as ho-
mogeneous that individual preferences, supplies and demands behave in a
uniform way. So, the relative prices of commodities are unaffected when
moved from one country to another, maintaining the purchasing power
parity among countries at a given supply of money.
However, it is exactly this homogeneous principle that the non-neutral
approach denies. Their belief that money is non-neutral implies that it af-
fects real economic variables in a permanent way. If the conditions under
which production occurs are not the same, money affects different econo-
mic spaces in different ways. Therefore, fixing the exchange rate at a pur-
chasing power parity rate or liberalising the market along the neo-classical
optimisation principle of a tatônnement adjustment to long-run equilib-
rium values are meaningless goals. Moreover, conceiving the space as non-
homogeneous involves the conception of constantly changing relative
prices. The exchange rate prescription, or the use of the exchange rate as a
policy tool, is the idea that, in a discretionary way, the rate should be ad-
justed in the direction in which it is best able to assist in the achievement of
selected goals. And as far as the advocates of the “non-neutral view” are
concerned, output growth is the main objective that society should pursue.
In this group we have placed, for example, the structuralists, to whom
exchange-rate variations adjust the balance of payments only at a very high
social cost. Therefore, they consider it to be more desirable to adopt adjust-
ment instruments such as an industrial policy and even protectionist prac-
tices.23 They highlight that adjustment process problems are rooted in the
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malfunctioning of market mechanisms due to institutional rigidities; sticky
wages; a sticky pattern of exports and imports; and even the existence of a
qualitative differentiation between products that can lead to a lack of com-
petitiveness, even when there are exchange rate variations.
Structuralist analysis assumes that the automatisms of the fixed rule, or
of the market in the case of floating rates, disregard the macroeconomic
context in which the adjustment occurs. In particular, this disregard in-
volves not contemplating different countries’ specificities and the fact that
adjustments may not work as prescribed by the theory, or may work but at a
very high social cost, given the internal problems faced.
A further neo-structuralist argument, introduced in the 1980s to reject
the efficiency of freely floating exchange rates as an adjustment mechanism,
focuses on a kind of price stickiness — in foreign currency — that arises from
the fact that exporting firms, most of the time, are organised as oligopolies.
In accordance with this argument, the strategy of firms operating under im-
perfect competition and facing uncertainty regarding future exchange rates
is to ensure the maintenance of their prices in foreign currency if the ex-
change rate should depreciate. They do so in order to guarantee a higher
profit margin, thereby frustrating the normal course of the adjustment de-
scribed by the models that embody the first two views presented herein,
namely short and long-run money neutrality. This sort of behaviour, known
as “pricing for market”, has a possible theoretical basis in Dornbusch’s
(1987) work, and some empirical evidence for it can be seen in Martson’s
(1989) research. These works also develop the concept of “hysteresis”, ac-
cording to which the relationship between exchange-rate movements and
the real economy does not occur in the way described by the conventional
model. For instance, when an exchange variation drives firms overseas, this
process is not reversible even if the exchange rate should reverse its move-
ment, for it implies reversible costs24  and, besides, entrepreneurs facing un-
certainty would rather adopt a “wait-and-see” type of behaviour in the pres-
ence of significant exchange rate fluctuations.25
The Post-Keynesian approach, whilst focusing on the role of the uncer-
tainty that permeates the economy, as well as on that of money (non-neu-
tral) and its real effects upon production, tends to prescribe fixed (pegged
but adjustable) exchange rates, although the basis for fixation certainly dif-
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fers. Their arguments differ from McKinnon’s, for instance, as the allow for
adjustments in order to “reflect permanent increases in efficiency wages”26
(Davidson, 1992-1993, p. 161), or to adjust economies with persistent for-
eign deficits gradually and less painfully.
Davidson (1985), in a stimulating article entitled “Propositions con-
cerning liquidity for a new Bretton-Woods”, analytically explores the need
to guarantee enough liquidity to restructure demand and foster economic
growth. Thus, he preaches the need among governments, and especially
central banks, to supply an effective structure of last-resort lenders.
In his article, Davidson supports the creation of a Unionized Monetary
System (UMS), defined either as a system with a single currency or mul-
tiple currencies but with an established fixed rate. According to him, this
system ought to accomplish three objectives, namely: it should minimise
uncertainty; it should avoid liquidity restrictions in the use of resources by
means of an International Money Clearing Unit (IMCU) — the unit of ac-
count and ultimate reserve asset for international liquidity, to be held only
by central banks; and it should supply an expansionary trend to solve pay-
ment problems.
Not all Post-Keynesians agree with the idea of an IMCU, but all of them
accept the need to reduce the uncertainty that affects economic decisions
and advocate discretionary policies to prevent international liquidity crises
and promote growth. Concerning the reduction of uncertainty, this would
come from one less uncertainty, the one regarding the unforeseeability of
the exchange rate. As for the availability of liquidity, Post-Keynesians
emphasise Keynes’ idea that in a framework of unemployment, economic
activity is limited by liquidity restrictions and by lack of an aggressive eco-
nomic policy rather than by lack of income. Therefore, every innovation is
welcome if it makes international monetary flows easier, fosters production
and trade, and assures both the quantity and adequate distribution of an as-
set that better performs the money function of being a store of value. This
Post-Keynesian argument is a clear defence of the need to use economic
policy to accomplish and assure economic growth. Also implicitly stated is
the importance that these analysts attach to the role money can play to
make this process more effective (reflected in the authors’ preoccupation
with adequate flows of liquidity).
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According to Davidson’s (1992-1993) formal proposal for a new inter-
national payments system, a UMS allows a better interrelation between re-
gional or national monetary systems.As he argues: “in an interdependent
world economy, some degree of economic co-operation among trading
partners is necessary” to foster expansionist pressures in world trade and
development, (op. cit., p. 157). Nevertheless, he recognises that “at this stage
of the evolution of world politics, however, a global UMS with a suprana-
tional central bank is not feasible” (op. cit., p. 157-158). The discretionary
features of economic policies embodied in this argument lie in the proposal
for a co-ordination policy to be adopted by countries in agreement with the
goals they expect to accomplish, and the aspiration of reducing the social
costs of adjustment. The rules referred to by Aglietta, therefore, are not to
be interpreted as rigid rules, but as negotiated ones, that can and should be
modified through co-ordinated action among countries.
It is interesting to notice that Davidson’s arguments enforce the impor-
tance of broadening liquidity for growth, making use of the non-neutrality
of money assumption. Aglietta, however, as a Post-Keynesian with a
regulationist’s orientation, explores such non-neutrality from the perspec-
tive of liquidity preference, and argues that it may cause problems and lead
to crises, as we pointed out when analysing the difficulties created by the
flexibility of the exchange rate in an international scenario of high capital
mobility. Besides, in accordance with Aglietta’s view, the interaction among
countries causes disturbances in international relations, where adjustment
costs could be very high. Such costs, or “externalities”, are not absorbed by
automatic adjustments. They have to do with the interdependence among
countries that could be solved only through explicit co-ordination by rules
which countries agree to impose on themselves and which define, within
the strategic intervention fields, subsets of completely compatible decisions.
Thus, Aglietta (1986 a) calls international money “every way of organising
national reserves that fulfils this centralisation (...) such that market uncer-
tainty is diminished, and the interaction costs among countries are re-
duced” (ibid., p. 17).
According to Aglietta (1986 a), the long-run neutral group advocated
floating exchange rates by stating that it would guarantee continuous ad-
justments of the balance of payments and give independence to reach do-
mestic aims through domestic means. The long-run neutrals argue that an
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international currency is impractical given the entrenched preoccupation of
central banks with the accumulation of foreign reserves. Against this, how-
ever, it should be noted that capital mobility has worked to a great extent as
private money creation, but without distinguishing private financing from
adjustment from disequilibria, and without control by monetary authori-
ties. This sort of process has created problems that go beyond the discussion
about which exchange regime is best and that require the analysis of another
fundamental issue intrinsically related to the previous one: why monetary
rules may be needed. The reason why it is necessary to attempt to control
international monetary flows through co-ordinated rules among countries
lies in the fact that money is active and not neutral.
Following this sort of argument, the macroeconomic disequilibria faced
by European countries during the 1980’s suggest that only the instability of
international monetary relations — due to lack of monetary rules — can
explain the magnitude of those problems and the degree of the observed
generalised distress in the economic atmosphere, even though structural
weaknesses and economic mismanagement have also caused problems to
many sectors of the economy.
Thus, while Davidson suggests a centralisation of monetary dynamics
through an offsetting international system in order to guarantee growth,
Aglietta draws attention to the problems caused by lack of such centra-
lisation, with fluctuations and free capital flows leading either to excess in-
debtedness or to the consequent lack of credibility and instability of the li-
quidity preference among many currencies.27
Guttmann, likewise a Marxist oriented towards regulation, suggests that
“the emerging global accumulation regime requires “an additional layer of
management and regulation, based on new multilateral arrangements and
international policy-making institutions” (Guttmann, 1994, p. 427). In-
spired by Keynes’ Bancor plan, he proposes a supranational credit-money
(SNCM) such that any transaction between countries should be carried out
in SNCM. Moreover, he states that “since SNCM coexists with national cur-
rencies rather than replacing them, (…) exchange rates do not have to be ir-
revocably locked. Instead, they should be subject to adjustments whenever
underlying trade imbalances threaten to create unstable conditions” (Gut-
tmann, 1994, p. 443).
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Authors such as Aglietta, De Bernis, Cartapanis and others connected to
the CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales)
as well as Guttmann (1994), have an economic conception that differs
widely from the previously discussed “short-run neutral” and “long-run
neutral” approaches. Opposing the idea of homogeneity in trade space, the
economic world of such theorists is one of competition and conflicts among
currencies and national policies, where the exchange rate is not a variable of
adjustment but is part of the policies and part of the private financial
behaviour that affect all national economies. The market system is, accord-
ing to them, not able to deal with these problems. As Cartapanis (1984,
p. 22) argues: “the instability of the floating exchange rates presents itself
more as an exchange sanction of an intrinsically unstable economic reality,
in the sense that national differences seem not to be absorbed by world mar-
ket mechanisms or by monetary automatism”. The idea is to understand
the conflicting relations among nations that are hierarchically structured
and to analyse such conflicts as express themselves through exchange rate
instability, instead of conceiving the economic system as homogeneous or
able to become homogeneous thanks to a good adjustment of relative
prices.
De Bernis and Byé (1987) also do not believe in the supposed regulating
virtues of floating rates. They see international relations as relations among
differentiated productive systems, articulated through differentiated power
relations. They also assign high fluctuations in floating rates to the crises
caused by the way regulation is made. This showed up in the 1970’s and
1980s through generalised inflation, structural distortions in the balance of
payments, and generalised financing problems.
The ‘non-neutral’ position, while recognising differences and peculiari-
ties among countries, considers a fixed rate as adequate because “it obliges
to more coherence” (De Bernis and Bye, 1987, p. 388) and because private
agents’ demand for reserves does not need to go beyond what is necessary
for transactions (Aglietta, 1986 b) when exchange rates are fixed and the
“superior type of liquidity”28 is identified. Therefore, centralisation of re-
serves in the Central Bank reduces the need for them in the aggregate and
releases liquidity for growth. Yet, they allow the rate to be realigned (“ad-
justable peg”), in order to accommodate specific problems (Davidson,
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1992-1993) and outcomes from agreements and co-ordination among
countries. Such agreements and co-ordination are fundamental (Aglietta,
1986 a, b, c) to their prescription of an exchange regime that is placed in be-
tween the other two extremes. Furthermore, these authors do not believe
that the exchange regime itself protects countries from disturbances gener-
ated abroad.
The critique
Criticism of the pegged (fixed but adjustable) exchange rate to be used by
governments as a policy tool presents two arguments: first, according to
these critics, if this sort of behaviour is to be followed by several countries
simultaneously and if the implicit goal is an increase in the competitiveness
of their goods in the international market through devaluations of the do-
mestic currency, this may trigger price battles similar to what economic lit-
erature recognises as the old “beggar-thy-neighbour” practice of competi-
tive devaluations. Secondly, there is a direct link between discretion in
monetary matters and loss of credibility. This link is established by those
who, basing their arguments on the QTM, assume that there is a unique
equilibrium quantity of money that assures zero inflation. They further as-
sume that the quantity of money can be and actually is controlled by mon-
etary authorities. The cause of inflation, therefore, is connected to a lack of
control by monetary authorities who submit to pressures from the govern-
ment, who try to finance their expenditures by means of inflationary money
creation. Under these circumstances, the prescription is to allow no discre-
tion on monetary policy. The New Classical approach maintains that prices
adjust very quickly. Using the hypothesis of rational expectations, its au-
thors argue that mere anticipated increases in money supply are sufficient
to increase prices (even when money increases do not actually occur). In
other words, in a rational expectation framework, monetary policy has no
real effects in the economy.
Critics also argue that discretionary behaviour implies, within a frame-
work where time inconsistency prevails, a tendency of policymakers to
adapt the original policy measures in order to make them appropriate for
the current economic context. Since this behaviour is anticipated by eco-
nomic agents (unions, voters, etc.), policy-makers’ discretion is effectively
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negated and the outcome does not lead to any gain but only inflationary
losses from the point of view of the economy as a whole.29
Given the above conclusions, if the credibility issue is taken into consid-
eration, from the point of view of the advocates of fixed exchange rates the
non-neutral view proposal leads to losing price stability. For those who de-
fend floating rates, the non-neutral proposal is conducive to speculative
behaviour due to a loss of credibility implied by discretion. As mentioned
before, this is the kind of criticism that underlies Krugman’s (1979) contri-
bution when he associates balance-of-payments crises and foreign reserve
exhaustion in the course of a speculative attack. The defence presented by
theorists who advocate fixed but adjustable exchange rates is based on the
idea that currency crises may result from endogeneous economic variables
rather than from discretionary governmental intervention. Currency crises
should not be taken as anomalies but as the result of a liberalisation of glo-
bal financial markets that has substantially diminished governmental power
to counteract the market logic through the creation of conventions, restric-
tions, prohibitions and general legal regulations to avoid or at least attenu-
ate those crises.
The problems caused by exchange-rate volatility post-1973 stimulated
the formulation of intermediate proposals by ‘long-run neutral’ theorists
such as Dornbusch (1988), who suggests controls over capital flows, and
Williamson (1987, 1988), who suggests the adoption of target-zone ar-
rangements, points on which we will comment in the following section so as
to contrast this proposal with that of fixed but adjustable exchange rates
supported by non-neutral authors. Our central intention is to show that the
proposal for a pegged (fixed but adjustable) regime rests on an entirely dif-
ferent monetary conception than the proposals made by “long-run neutral”
economists, who advocate flexible exchange rates and/or target bands.
2.4 Exchange-rate bands: a proposal to stabilise
exchange rates
Theoretical arguments
The target-zone arrangement is a system in which the exchange rate can
move “freely” within the borders of the zone or band — a lower and an up-
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per limit — explicitly or implicitly established by monetary authorities. The
fixed reference target (the FEER — Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange
Rate) around which the exchange rate fluctuates is theoretically estimated
as a parity that is presumably likely to guarantee the economy’s internal and
external balance. In order to reconcile this proposition with his defence of
flexible exchange rates, Williamson (1987, p. 203) argues that the wider the
bands around the fixed FEER, the more a country can benefit from the
“social functions” of exchange rate flexibility in a context of fixed exchange
rates.
The basic idea in these models is strikingly simple, although the math-
ematics is not. When the bands are credible and rational expectations pre-
vail, the movements of the exchange rate, once it has been determined by
fundamental variables, will not go beyond the limits of the band, given the
expectation that governments will be committed to intervene in order to
defend the limits.
The imposition of bands is frequently regarded as convenient (Frenkel
and Goldstein, 1986), in that it works as an anchor for exchange-rate expec-
tations in the medium term and plays a stabilising role, avoiding the volatil-
ity that characterises exchange-rate movements when they are left to float
freely. Furthermore, the bands could allow the establishment of discipline
and co-ordination among macroeconomic policies, preventing misalign-
ment of currencies and creating favourable conditions for sustained
growth. In this regard, for instance, it is argued that they could facilitate a
more effective control by institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), by acting towards an alignment of currencies and reducing the
asymmetries of adjustment processes. Finally, the bands, when credible,
could permit economies to escape from the effects of high capital mobility,
the huge amounts of speculative capital inflows and outflows, and the sud-
den changes in interest rates — all of which contributed to the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system.
Williamson (1988) argues in favour of reconciling different inflation
rates through a target-zone system; of the ease of adjustment made possible
by realignments of the real band limits in response to permanent shocks;
and of the possibility of a countercyclical monetary policy and of absorbing
speculative shocks.
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Therefore, the band system is conveniently placed between the fixed sys-
tem and the floating one, representing an attempt to avoid not only the
latter’s volatility, which has characterised the period after 1973, but also the
stickiness of the former, which causes problems to governments and allows
currencies to be subject to speculative attacks whenever the maintenance of
the fixed exchange-rate parity becomes difficult. Besides, the band system
partially reaffirms the role of a discretionary monetary policy that is impos-
sible in a fixed exchange-rate framework.
The critique
Some critics of the band system30 argue that if rates play the role of a nomi-
nal anchor, this could be done by maintaining floating rates and by an-
nouncing a monetary policy consistent with the movements of these rates.
To more free-market-oriented critics, the idea that the announcement of
bands works better as a signal than the announcement of a monetary policy
is controversial, because it assumes that in fixing the bands the government
has superior information, which is a dubious contention as far as they are
concerned.
On the other hand, realigning bands is viewed as problematic, as it can
lead to lack of credibility. The need to realign the bands, according to such
critics, can hardly be avoided, since real economies change and it is difficult
if not impossible to establish equilibrium exchange rates. Finally, if the
bands are kept fixed while there are macroeconomic changes, then there
will occur additional distortions in the form of speculative capital flows.
Concerning capital flows, the critics of the band system argue that those
flows are becoming larger and thereby able to cause frequent and discon-
tinuous changes in the bands, which may lead to their collapse.
As for the discipline and co-ordination provided by the band system, the
critics’ argument is that they are made unrealistic by the priority given by
governments to domestic goals over foreign ones; they also point out that
bands may be destabilising whenever their maintenance prevents the
achievement of domestic macroeconomic objectives. Moreover, they state
that bands account for divergences in monetary policies but do not create
consistency. Such consistency requires negotiations which are often tough
and contentious between the parties owing to different growth objectives,
distribution targets, and other domestic goals.
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As for IMF approval, mentioned as one of the bands’ advantages, this is
not guaranteed because the Fund also uses indicators other than exchange
rates. Besides, control over the bands takes place through monetary policy
and not through a mixture of fiscal and monetary policy. This constraint
could further hinder the attainment of domestic macroeconomic goals.
Also, it is not clear who should be paying for the costs of macroeconomic
adjustments within the bands, and to what extent such adjustments should
take place.
Non-neutral theorists emphasise the perceived theoretical misconcep-
tions underlying the management and establishment of bands as conceived
by Williamson (1992-1993). Target zones embody the idea of an internal
equilibrium linked to a certain unemployment level — the Non-Accelerat-
ing Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), a concept whose existence
Williamson considers it a “failure” not to recognise (Williamson, 1992-
1993, p. 182). Davidson (1992-1993) has pointed out that “in defining the
target for internal equilibrium in terms of a NAIRU concept, Williamson in-
troduces the exception that prevents the facilitating payments’ social func-
tion from being operative” (op. cit., p. 167).
Indeed, to Williamson (1992-1993) the fundamental equilibrium ex-
change rate (FEER) and the growth rate of nominal demand are intermedi-
ate goals towards achieving external and internal equilibria. As a matter of
fact, as it is observed by Davidson:
Williamson’s analysis also assumes the neutrality of money when he indi-
cates that his basic argument is that a nominal rule (in a closed economy)
fulfils the same function as a money supply rule. By targeting nominal
growth in domestic income (in a closed system) or nominal domestic de-
mand (in an open system), Williamson is presuming that the authorities can
always control inflation without altering the long-run NAIRU. (Davidson,
1992-1993, p. 168-169)
The point is the assumption of long-run money neutrality. It is so be-
cause, if money is never neutral, its effects on production, by increasing it,
would not allow prices to rise proportionately, as predicted by the QTM.
Thus, the effects on employment could be permanent, without necessarily
being subject to the “magic NAIRU” (Davidson, 1992-1993, p. 167).
The determination of the NAIRU and of rules to guarantee internal and
external equilibrium supposes an economic model whereby it is possible to
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draw an a priori point to identify a medium and long-term attraction point,
the equilibrium exchange point.
Post-Keynesians such as Davidson as well as non-neutral theorists gen-
erally do not accept that it is possible to determine any a priori equilibrium
point, even in the long run, because the equilibrium point itself tends to
change according to changes in the general conditions of the economy.
Thus, they raise doubts about the rule of determination and management of
the reference exchange rate, and about the growth rate of the nominal prod-
uct, according to that criterion. As a matter of fact, it is well known that a
general equilibrium framework, which is the logical outcome of a Carte-
sian-Euclidean approach to economics, cannot incorporate the major in-
gredients of Post-Keynesian analysis: non-neutrality of money, the exist-
ence of uncertainty, and historical time. Therefore, their criticism goes
beyond the question of determining the bands and their reference rate. “Ac-
cordingly, if the actions of the authority to “adjust” targets create, inter alia,
continuing changes, then there need not exist any simultaneous internal
and external equilibrium toward which the economy can converge”
(Davidson, 1992-93, p. 171). Also, expectations do not have this anchorage
point, being permeated with uncertainty. Hence, they could be destabilising
and threaten the feasibility of the bands.
In the absence of any guarantee that expectations will be stabilising,
most Post-Keynesians and other non-neutral economists prefer greater dis-
cretionary government control, which would be closer to the day-to-day
running of the economy. What is common to these groups is a lack of trust
in the self-regulating nature of private markets.
It is important to point out that target bands without the conception of
the NAIRU embodied in the calculation of the FEER are not subject to the
above criticism. Without this assumption target bands are similar do ad-
justable exchange rates, especially if these bands are moving ones. The con-
ception of bands as proposed by Williamson (1992-1993) is subject to criti-
cism exactly because he makes use of the NAIRU to estimate the FEER, and
explicitly considers it a “failure” not to recognise its existence (ibid., p. 182).
In using this procedure his explanation conforms to the long-run-neutral-
ity-of-money view.
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3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Having reviewed the main disagreements between theorists’ different pre-
scriptions about exchange-rate regimes, what lessons have we learned? First,
that unlike pegged (fixed but adjustable) exchange rates, both fixed and
floating rates are consistent with free-market mechanisms for international
payments. Under a floating regime a national currency seeks its own level in
relation to other currencies. A country operating under fixed exchange rates
(with its domestic currency freely convertible into the reserve currency at
an absolutely fixed exchange rate) operates under the discipline of the
country (a hard currency country and, normally, a floater) to which its local
currency is tied.
Secondly, we must conclude that all extreme forms of exchange-rate ar-
rangements are problematic, since the “automatic mechanisms” they em-
body prevent countries from concentrating on their domestic needs.
The differences between the two intermediate positions discussed in this
discussion — target zones and managed exchange rates — reflect theorists’
beliefs regarding the automatic self-regulating properties of private econo-
mies, and how much discretion should be allowed to governments in deal-
ing with the economic decision-making process. This is also the point be-
hind the debate between the automatism of fixed rules (fixed exchange
rates) on the one hand, and the discretionary properties embodied in a sys-
tem of managed exchange rates, on the other. If this is the case, our con-
cluding remarks, from the point of view of developing countries, tend to
favour discretion rather than rigid rules.
Two points are relevant when the rules vs. discretion debate is revisited
in the context of this present topic. The first is the “mainstream” nature of
rigid rules and the credibility problem associated with their implementa-
tion. The second is the inconvenience and unsustainability of sticking to
rigid rules and forcing monetary authorities to relinquish any degree of dis-
cretionary power.
The dominant literature advocates the superiority of rules. Policy rules
proponents view private economy as inherently self-correcting and are pes-
simistic about the feasibility of stabilising the economy through government
policy intervention, because they consider that any sort of government in-
tervention is inherently inefficient.
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We belong to the group of economists that look at this view with scepti-
cism. It is curious, to say the least, how rule-breaking is sometimes sanc-
tioned by adherents to this view.
The discussion of rules vs. discretion revolves primarily around the cred-
ibility of different governments. A frequently mentioned argument is that
in the absence of a credible commitment mechanism binding policy actions
over time, governments are led to produce inflationary outcomes, in their
pursuit of stabilisation policies. Commitment to fixed rules would therefore
be one way of trying to achieve time consistency. The general proposition is
that credibility affects the behaviour of private decision-makers, leading
them to lower inflationary expectations and permitting the market to per-
form better, thereby leading the economy towards a sustainable equilib-
rium growth path. The credibility issue arises when rules change over time.
According to King:
In the context of monetary policy, credibility has a precise meaning. A mon-
etary strategy — a plan of future policy actions contingent upon events — is
credible if the public believes that the government will actually carry out its
plans. Credibility is, therefore, a question of whether announced intentions
are believable (...) A future monetary policy action is credible if it is in the
interest of the monetary authorities to enact this policy when the time
comes. Hence policy is credible when the authorities’ actions are, as econo-
mists put it, “time consistent”, that is, the authorities have no incentive to
deviate from their original intentions. (King, 1995, p. 2)
The “short-run neutral” (monetarist) background of the advocates of
monetary rules can be clearly identified. For monetarists, the stock of
money can be controlled by the monetary authorities, and money does not
affect (at least in the long run) real economic variables. Price rises occur
when governments do not control the expansion of the money stock. Infla-
tion is, therefore, a phenomenon caused by the lack of governments’ will-
ingness to control monetary aggregates. But if they constantly pursue this
irresponsible strategy, they will lack credibility in the future.
It is the link established between government’s behaviour and inflation
outcomes that leads to the prescription of rules such as a specie standard or
a system in which the issue of domestic money becomes tied to the amount
of an outside asset such as the US dollar or the German mark (nominal an-
40  R. Econ. contemp., Rio de Janeiro, 5(1): 5-47, jan./jun. 2001
chors), at a fixed exchange rate. In its extreme version we have currency-
board arrangements of a sort that was widely used in former British colo-
nies.
But by their own admission, short-run and long-run neutral theorists
have failed to explain exchange rate determination, hence becoming con-
fused when trying to prescribe a choice of exchange-rate regimes. First, they
have come to admit that rules must be contingent in order to avoid time-
consistency problems. As King argues:
One way of trying to achieve time consistency is to precommit to a fixed rule
— for example, set interest rate so that some measure of money supply
grows at a constant rate each year. The problem is that such rules are sub-
optimal: from time to time shocks occur which mean that the optimal
growth rate of money supply changes. When shocks are sufficiently frequent
and large, as they have been in most countries, the rule becomes discredited
and is, literally, incredible. No rule for monetary policy has been discovered
which could credibly be followed. It is inevitable, therefore, that as Henry
Simons argued in 1936, monetary policy “must rely on a large element of
discretion”. (King, 1995, p. 2)
Second, “short-run and long-run neutral” economists generally assume
that the “fundamentals” determine exchange rates. However, they have
been unable to support this view. The fact that real-world exchange market
expectations may show no strong correlation with a set of fundamental de-
terminants has been recognised by Dornbusch’s comments on Bordo’s
(1993) paper, for example, when he argues:
A central determination of the direction of capital flows is the interest differ-
ential adjusted for exchange rate expectations. Unfortunately, those expec-
tations have no tight link to reality (...) Of course, if expectations that are out
of touch with market fundamentals come to dominate the level of rates,
economists and policy makers alike face a conundrum. We can no longer
say that markets know best. (op. cit., p. 103)
In saying so, Dornbusch is recognising that markets may not always
know better than governments. In other words, what we are trying to argue
is that within the dominant “mainstream” analysis, arguments have been
presented by their own advocates in favour of greater discretion. For in-
stance, the idea that monetary rules may not work since real economies are
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subject to changes, and the rules might become inadequate over time, is an
example. Another idea relates to doubts raised with regard to private mar-
ket efficiency and the stability of expectations.
Therefore, the defence of limited discretionary policies that enable cen-
tral banks to pursue monetary and fiscal policies according to the changing
needs of their economies is an inevitable outcome.
In conclusion, if the method of analysis is built on the idea that money is
not neutral, that expectations form under uncertainty, and if we use histori-
cal rather than logical time, factors that are all strongly interdependent, as
has been stressed by Post-Keynesian theorists, we have to preclude the use
of general targets and rigid rules as adequate policies to meet unexpected
changes, because we do not know if when the events occur these rules will
still apply. In other words, we can never relinquish some degree of discre-
tion so as to be able to adapt the economy to sudden changes that are con-
stantly happening in the real world. This way of reasoning is compatible
with “path dependent” models which consider historical time. The essence
of historical time is that it generates structural changes which invalidate the
use of ironclad rules.
NOTES
1. There are several interesting review articles dealing with the topic of early and new mod-
els of exchange-rate behaviour. See, for instance, Peter Isard (1995). An excellent refer-
ence presenting a Post-Keynesian analysis of orthodox approaches to exchange-rate de-
termination is Harvey (1996). Harvey draws on the work of several orthodox theorists
and uses their most popular arguments to explain rate movements in order to show that
each one of them — rational expectations, market efficiency, “news”, speculative
bubbles, etc. — is a response to the failure of full-fledged neoclassical models to explain
rate movements (op. cit., p. 574). For a Post-Keynesian view of exchange rate determi-
nation we refer to Harvey (1991).
2. We are of course aware that underlying the choice of an exchange-rate regime there ex-
ists a particular understanding of how exchange rates are determined. However, it is im-
possible to deal with the theme in its completeness in a single paper.
3. This aspect will be better developed along the paper. However, it is possible to illustrate
our point of view by using the following example: if money is neutral, it does not affect
relative prices and, consequently, the real side of the economy. The circular flow of in-
come and expenditures that defines Say´s Law of Markets is not affected by monetary
impulses that guarantee market equilibrium. In this case, the market is the best regula-
tor, the government being either unnecessary or inefficient when it intervenes in eco-
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nomic activity. However, if money is non-neutral it will affect market equilibrium. For
instance, when monetary conceptions accept the principle that there are rational rea-
sons to hoard money or to show a preference for liquidity, it can be observed that leak-
ages from and injections into the circular flow of income are not always equal. This is a
sufficient condition to reject Say’s Law. It is the preference for hoarding rather than ex-
pending that gives support to the non-neutrality of money and leads heterodox theo-
rists to abandon Say’s Law. In this case, the inefficacy of markets to regulate the
economy imposes a role of permanent government intervention in the workings of
macroeconomy.
4. Search for efficiency here is not necessarily incompatible with economic growth targets
as growth is expected to stem from the workings of the market. However, when dealing
with monetary policy the main objective is price stability since these theorists believe
that money has no permanent effects upon real variables. It is neutral.
5. Neumeyer (1998) uses a model that “applies general equilibrium theory to investigate
how a monetary union affects the efficiency of allocation of risks in an economy with
incomplete asset markets” (p. 246). As it is well known, models of this kind embody the
notion of logical rather than historical time and reject the idea of radical uncertainty, in
disagreement with heterodox theorists’ views. As for uncertainty, Post-Keynesians follow
Keynes in arguing that “human decisions affecting the future, whether personal or politi-
cal or economic, cannot depend on strict mathematical expectations, since the basis for
making such calculations does not exist (Keynes, 1964, p. 162-163). These differences, as
will become clear, are crucial to the taxonomy we have adopted along this paper.
6. The argument is compatible with the idea of a vertical Phillips curve, according to
which it is not possible to conceive of monetary effects over the real economy even in
the short run, since the agents foresee future inflation. In so doing they do not develop
monetary illusions. They realise that real wages will be lower due to inflation and will
not counterbalance the marginal disutility of labour. Therefore, they conclude that em-
ployment should not rise. Thus, the unemployment level is considered natural and not
capable of being reduced by monetary expansion. The absence of real effects derived
from monetary movements (money neutrality) means that, with the quantity equation
MV=Py, there is no impact of money variations (M) upon the real product (y). Since a
constant velocity of money (V) is assumed, every impact derived from monetary move-
ments is then transmitted to the price level.
7. Ricardo developed a similar argument in defence of the gold standard in the “High Price
of Bullion — a proof of the depreciation of bank notes”, reprinted in The Works and
Correspondence of David Ricardo, edited by Piero Sraffa, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1966.
8. The rates in Bretton Woods were not rigidly fixed. There were scape clauses that permit-
ted rate readjustments in special circumstances, and rates were indeed readjusted many
times.
9. This is the most recent argument presented by Dornbusch (1999), who had formerly
been associated with the defence of floating rates (Dornbusch, 1976, 1987 and 1988),
when refering to nations such as Latin American ones, viewed as poor in terms of cred-
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ibility. It is the lack of government credibility that leads some theorists to propose the
adoption of rigid rules associated with fixed exchange rates, tying the hands of monetary
authorities. Changes in money supply become dependent on international reserves
movements.
10. See also Obstfeld (1995).
11. This has been formalised by Obstfeld (1996) and Velasco (1996), among others, and has
been called “the second generation of Krugman’s model” (Frankel, 1996).
12. According to the absolute version of the PPP, the purchasing power of the American
dollar, for example, is identical in any country. In its relative version, it is sufficient that
the purchasing power of the dollar in relation to another currency change in the same
proportion.
13. This sort of argument, as reminded by Krugman (1991), recaptures the debate between
Keynes and Ohlin concerning transfers, where the latter stated that changes in relative
prices were not necessary in order for capital transfers to generate a corresponding trade
surplus, while Keynes argued that a real depreciation of the currency of the country that
made the transfer was necessary.
14. As noted by Krugman (1991), to the left of this position are interventionists, who be-
lieve that “job creation should be pursued through microeconomic as well as macroeco-
nomic means, for example through regional and industrial policies” (op. cit., p. 24), and
to the right there are “the monetarists and their even more free-market-oriented
sucessors” who “think that the government should be as laissez-faire about aggregate
demand as it is about supply and demand in individual markets” (op. cit., p. 24).
15. We shall see later in the text that actual free fluctuations have not confirmed this con-
clusion.
16. Friedman’s argument favouring floating exchange rates is coherent with his conclusions
on the long-run neutrality of money, which results from the adaptive expectation hy-
pothesis that he advocates. In the short run agents do not guess precisely the actual in-
flation rate and make mistakes in the process of expectation formation. Therefore, dur-
ing this period workers are hired on lower real wages compared to their equilibrium
levels (levels associated with correct formation of expectations). It follows that, accord-
ing to his point of view, money alters the short-run pattern of economic growth. How-
ever, in the long run these wrong guesses are corrected so that the economy is led to-
wards it’s natural unemployment rate, and then money becomes neutral.
17. His position is different from McKinnon’s, who, as Williamson (1988, p. 115) explains,
“will deny that there is any need to have differential inflation, except in countries with a
fiscal requirement for the inflation tax, since we now know that the long-run Phillips
curve is vertical and hence that faster inflation does not buy worthwhile output gains”.
18. Such problems that arise from floating exchange rates have another actual indicator: the
widespread practice among different countries of a “dirty” floating, that is, the market
may determine the rate but it will face some sort of interference by central banks. Even
those who fiercely defend market efficiency in the establishment of commodity prices
recognise that the exchange rate is far too important a price to be left completely at the
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mercy of demand and supply forces. Indeed, in a floating-rate system, when an
economy faces unemployment, the central bank is tempted to intervene, artificially de-
valuating the exchange rate in order to take advantage of more competitive conditions
in international markets for its domestic commodities transactions. The desired result is
an increase in exports with expansionary repercussions on product and employment.
This is what economic literature recognises as “beggar-thy-neighbour” practices of
competitive devaluations. It is true that this is a less usual practice nowadays with the
liberalisation process. However, we can observe interventions with the purpose of
avoiding problems related to misalignment of exchange rates. These are the so-called
dirty floating practices in the context of floating exchange-rate arrangements.
19. It is the effect according to which the real economy does not always react to exchange-
rate movements the way the dominant theory would expect. For instance, if an ex-
change-rate movement brings about a change in the real economy the reversal of the
exchange effect does not imply the reversal of the real effects, because it implies high
costs. Thus, exchange volatility would have harmed the economy less than it was ex-
pected to do.
20. The terminology “debt economy” has been used by French authors in general (Lacoue-
Labarthe, 1980) to express the conception of economies whose process of accumulation
is financed by bank credit instead of financial markets. When talking about “interna-
tional debt economy” what is being highlighted is the importance of foreign debt in fi-
nancing the process of accumulation.
21. See Frankel (1996).
22. This difference in method is particularly emphasised by Post-Keynesians, who also ar-
gue that any analysis involving only some of these factors is logically incomplete given
the interdependence among them.
23. See, for instance, Kuttner (1991), quoted by Krugman (1991).
24. Baldwin and Krugman (1989), have introduced this idea as an assumption to explain
the persistence of foreign disequilibria in spite of exchange fluctuations.
25. This sort of argument seems to embody a Post-Keynesian element, for it highlights the
uncertainty of future rates in the “pricing-for-market” behaviour and that of great ex-
change fluctuations in the “wait-and-see” strategy that justifies the phenomenon of
“hysteresis”. However, the neo-Keynesian (Cross, 1993) suggestion that the concep-
tualisation of “hysteresis” is relevant to the Post-Keynesian understanding of economic
processes has been subjected to a lot of criticism. We will not go into this controversy
but we suggest the reader consult specialised articles such as the one written by
Davidson (1993).
26. Efficiency wage is defined as the money wage divided by the average product of labor. It
is “the unit labor cost modified by the profit markup in domestic money” (Davidson,
1992-1993, p. 161, footnote 14).
27. The idea is that in the absence of a single international currency, the existence of rival
currencies (competing for the role of main international currency) is itself a further
source of exchange rate volatility (Aglietta, 1987).
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28. Aglietta (1986a) calls international money a superior type of liquidity. When it does not
compete with others its status is well identified. But that is not the case currently, with
the observed competition between the dollar, the mark and the yen, for example.
29. The classical references on this topic are Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983 a, b).
30. See Frenkel and Goldstein (1986).
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